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ABSTRACT
The recent increase of domain–specific search engines, able
to discover information unknown by general–purpose search
engines, leads to their federation into a single entity, called
federated search engine. In this paper, we focus on how it
can effectively merge sponsored search results, provided by
the domain–specific search engines, into a unique list. In
particular, we discuss the case in which the same ad can
be provided by multiple sources, which requires information
about the ad to be merged. We approach the problem of
merging and sharing the revenue using mechanism design
techniques. The main impossibility result we obtain points
out there exists no mechanism that satisfies the customarily
required properties. Thus, we present several mechanisms
that violate at most one of these properties, and we experi-
mentally analyze them using a real–world Yahoo! dataset.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2 [Artificial Intelligence]: Miscellaneous
General Terms
Economics
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1. INTRODUCTION
Recently, we can see an increasing number of domain–
specific search engines (DSSEs), e.g., bravofly.com, book-
ing.com. Their advantage is that, for their specific domain,
they are able to scour the deep web finding information (hid-
den in e.g. databases) that current general–purpose engines
are unable to discover. This naturally leads to a new search
paradigm where federated search engines (FSEs) integrate
search results from heterogeneous DSSEs [1, 4] with the aim
of providing the users with a ‘one–stop shop’. However,
similar to their general–purpose counterpart, DSSEs rely
on revenue from sponsored search pay–per–click auctions.
Currently, publishers, that use organic search results from
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general–purpose search engines, can use this service for their
own websites for free, but in return the publishers require
to also show the ads of the search engine. The revenue from
clicks is then shared in a fixed way between the publisher
and the search engine. However, this solution is not prac-
tical for an FSE since it then needs to display a separate
list of ads for each domain–specific search engine. This is
especially an issue if the same ad appears in more than one
search engine (i.e. ads are shared among DSSEs). Although
there is considerable literature on sponsored search auctions,
to our knowledge [2] is the only other paper that considers
the problem of merging sponsored search results for an FSE.
However, the strong assumption is made that ads cannot be
shared, which we relax in this paper.
2. FEDERATED SEARCH ENGINE
Background The solution to the problem highlighted be-
fore, proposed in [2], is as follows. The FSE merges a selec-
tion of the ads into a coherent and unique list that it will
display. To do this effectively, it needs detailed information
about the ads that are known only by the DSSEs, i.e., the
qualities (which is used to calculate an ad’s click probabil-
ity) of each ad, as well the values (i.e., the amount that the
advertisers pay the search engines when their ad is clicked).
The authors of [2] approached the problem using mecha-
nism design techniques. They obtained the following results.
If the click probabilities are not influenced by the presence
of other ads (i.e., there are no externalities), the standard
VCG mechanism is dominant–strategy incentive compatible
for this setting (i.e., truthfully elicits the values and qual-
ities from the DSSEs). Furthermore, in the case of exter-
nalities between the ads, incentive compatibility can still be
achieved using an execution–contingent VCG mechanism,
where the payment is conditional on the realization of events
(in this case the actual ads clicked by the user). However,
this can only be achieved in ex–post, which requires others
to be truthful (and thus is slightly weaker than having dom-
inant strategies). Furthermore, although both mechanisms
are weakly budget balanced (i.e. the FSE does not make a
loss), this is only in expectation w.r.t. to events.
The New Challenge The work described above is based
on the strong assumption that ads cannot be shared. When
this assumption does not hold, as it commonly happens in
practice, the nature of the problem changes fundamentally.
Specifically, if an ad appears in multiple DSSEs, the FSE
needs to merge all the reports received for this ad in order
to accurately predict its click probability and produce effi-
cient allocations. However, this could incentivize a DSSE
to report a lower quality for some of its low–valued ads (for
which it does not expect to gain any profit) purely in order
to discredit the same ads from its competitors (thereby im-
proving the allocation for its remaining ads and/or reducing
the payment). Worse still, it could fabricate ads and simply
pretend to have the same ads as its competitors. Our aim is
to solve this challenge using mechanism design techniques.
3. CONTRIBUTIONS AND RESULTS
Our contributions and results are as follows:
1) We extend the models of federated sponsored search
auctions described in [2] to the case in which advertisers are
allowed to submit a bid to more than one DSSE, and we
show how this can be posed as a mechanism design prob-
lem. In particular, the main differences with the model pro-
posed in [2] are (i) the introduction a value merge function,
mva(vˆ), which returns the highest value associated with a
certain ad a given the reported value vˆ (we assume that the
DSSE that provides the highest value for an ad is the only
DSSE that receives money from the advertiser when the ad
is clicked), and a quality merge function, mq(qˆ), which re-
turns the merged quality for all the ads give the reported
qualities qˆ (thus, the click probability function, αa, results
to be a function of the allocation and the quality merge func-
tion); (ii) the analysis of two scenarios: one where DSSEs
are able to hide their ads and fabricate advertisers if this is
in their interest, and one (called verified) where this is not
possible since an ad verification mechanism is in place.
2) We theoretically prove that in general there exists no
execution–contingent mechanism that simultaneously guar-
antees allocation efficiency (AE), incentive compatibility (IC),
individual rationality (IR), and weak budget balance (WBB),
even considering ex–post implementation.
3) Due to the result described above, we focus on mech-
anisms that guarantee three of these properties. A natural
candidate to consider is the unique state–of–the–art mecha-
nism for an FSE model [2]. We observe that, in the general
setting in which ads can be shared, the mechanism violates
both IR and WBB.
4) We provide a range of different mechanisms that violate
at most one property among WBB, IR, and AE.
Mechanisms that violate the WBB property: We
propose a mechanism for the general case, MinRep, and a
mechanism for the verified case, VerifiedMinRep. The idea
behind them is similar to the one proposed (for a completely
different domain) in [5]: in the computation of a DSSE’s
payment, the mechanism considers virtual qualities (that
substitutes the ones actually reported by the agent) such
that the social welfare is minimized, and in turn also her
payment. The formula of the payment of a DSSE s in ex-
pectation w.r.t. the set of clicked ads ω, depending on the
reported qualities and values θˆ, given the true ones, θ, is
given by:
Eω[ps(θˆ∣ω)∣θ] = min
q′s∈Q sw
∗(vˆ, ⟨q′s, qˆ−s⟩)
− ∑
a∈f(θˆ)/A∗s
αa(f(vˆ, qˆ),mq(q)) ⋅mva(vˆ−s), (1)
where Q is the set of virtual qualities, f is the efficient allo-
cation, and sw∗ is the social welfare of the efficient allocation
(where x is an allocation):
sw∗(v,q) = max∑
a∈xαa(x,mq(q)) ⋅mva(v)
Note that in Eq. (1), mq(q) is based on the true qualities
since the payment is execution–contingent.
The difference between the two mechanisms lies in the
ads considered in the set of possible virtual reports, Q. In
particular, in the computation of a DSSE’s payment, Min-
Rep takes into account virtual qualities for all the ads, while
VerifiedMinRep considers only the one corresponding to the
DSSE’s actual ads.
Mechanisms that violate the IR property: We pro-
pose a mechanism for the general case, MaxRep, and a mech-
anism for the verified case, VerifiedMaxRep. The basic idea
is the same as the one presented for the mechanisms that
violate the WBB property, but instead of minimizing the
payment, we now maximize it.
Mechanism that violates the AE property: We focus
our investigation on strictly randomized mechanisms. We
propose a mechanism for the verified case, VerifiedRand,
that randomly selects with uniform probability which ads
to display and, if the ad is provided by multiple DSSEs, it
randomly selects with uniform probability which is the one
that will receive the money directly from the advertiser if
the ad is clicked. Payments are equal to zero. Focusing on
the non verified case, we prove that there exists no strictly
randomized mechanism that violates only the AE property.
Indeed, DSSEs can always influence the randomization by
hiding ads that give low expected utility, thus increasing the
chance that their ‘good’ ads are selected.
5) We experimentally evaluate and compare the mecha-
nisms presented in the paper and the state of the art in terms
of the FSE’s expected revenue and the DSSEs’ expected util-
ity. The experimental analysis we propose is based on the
Yahoo! Webscope A3 dataset. Results of the analysis show
that, as expected, different mechanisms are appropriate for
domains with different requirements. Furthermore, MaxRep
and VerifiedMaxRep turn out to be impractical due to the
extreme negative utility they provide to the DSSEs. Sim-
ilarly, MinRep is impractical because the FSE always gets
a negative revenue. In contrast, VerifiedMinRep turns out
to be suitable for the FSE when the number of DSSEs that
share the same ad is not too high (with 5 DSSEs if less that
the 60% of them shares the same ads). This pushes us to
design a verification mechanism that the FSE can use to
define the set of ads that belongs to each DSSE.
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